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1. Introduction 
OVer the past three years, the Institute of Urban Studies 
has helped in the formation of two non-profit housing corporations operated 
by Kinew Incorporated, and The People's Committee for a Better Neighbour-
hood. Both organizations arose from low cost housing needs identified 
as top priorities in the course of action research with citizen groups. 
The non profit provisions of the National Housing Act were seen as the best 
available· means of meeting these needs at the time. 
Since its inception, Kinew has grown rapidly, now handling 
some 75 units with as many more planned for the coming year. Kinew has 
thus far, however, fallen short of its original objective, which was to 
provide transitional housing and social assistance for the more needy 
native people about to establish· their first residence in the city. In 
spite of preferential interest rates, the annual rents required to cover 
mortgage, tax, and maintenance costs have initially restricted the homes 
to families with incomes above $5,500 many of whom have already adjusted 
to city life. 
The People's Committee housina, program is more in its formative 
stage. They too, have, however, encountered the problem of catering for 
the lower income members of their community. In the course of discussions 
with the Institute, a number of other management issues have arisen, 
such as means of selecting tenants, provision for future purchase by the 
tenant, rent and cost, pooling, security of tenure etc. 
With the prospect of new National Housing Act Legislation 
creating a major expansion of non profit housing, together with Manitoba's 
la 
accelerated Public Housing program, issues concerning the financing and 
management of housing through different institutional forms take on provin-
cial and nationwide importance. It is hoped that an examination of these 
questions now might assist governments in achieving the maximum potential 
from their programs. 
The purpose of this note is to outline some fundamental issues 
regarding the financing and pricing of urban housing services under different 
tenure arrangements. 
Some general evidence on practices in the different tenure 
markets is presented, that suggests a case for policy initiatives of sone 
form. The precise policy implications are, however to some extent open to 
dispute, depending on the relationships between the markets. A number of 
testable alternative hypothesis concerning these relationships are proposed, 
and methods of empirical verification are suggested. 
The issues or questions I propose to deal with are as follows: 
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II. The Issues 
1. Are there real financial advantages in home ownership? 
2. If so, what explains the large number of households who 
continue t~ rent on the private market? 
a) Are there specific situations where renting is a better 
financial prospect? 
b) Are there benefits to renting, such as general management 
services, that make the extra costs "10rthwhile for some 
persons. 
c) Are the costs of renting as low as they could be, or are 
there ways to lower them! 
d) Are there institutional constraints that preclude some persons 
from the financially preferable choice of home o"mership? 
3. ¥fuat are the advantages for consumers of public non-profit, 
co-op, and limited dividend housing, in comparison to the private ownership 
and rental markets? 
a) Do the consumers receive the benefits of home ownership as 
in no.l? 
b) If so, is the role of these institutions to provide a means 
of overcoming the constraints to ownership mentioned in 
2d, plus the advantages of renting as in 2a and 2b. 
c) Is the government subsidy through preferential interest 
rates the chief advantage? 
d) If so, what are the reasons for administering the subsidy in 
this form? 
4. Given the dual, ownership rental role of non-profit housing, 
what are the implications for establishing rents? 
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III. The Arguments 
Figure 1 below illustrates the time stream of mortgage pavments 
for a home owner purchasing in year zero, with a mortgage fixed in equal 
annual money payments. Aspects such ab downpayment, and reversion value 
are omitted for the time being to simplify the exposition. 
FIGURE 1 
Figure 2 represents ·the ti~e stream of rents facing a tenant 
in the private market. 
FIGURE 2 
0 
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The upward slope reflects the commonly observed inflation in the 
housing and rental markets. The slopes of the two payment schedules are 
clearly different. The significance for policy depends, however, on the 
relative heights of the two schedules. Two alternative possibilitie& are 
illustrated below in Figures 3 and 4. 
FIGURE 3 FIGURE 4 
If we assume for the moment, that items such as management, 
operating costs and fax differences have been netted out, then the o'qner in 
Figure 3 would clearly be financially better off than the tenant, and the 
landlord would be receiving above average profits represented by the shaded 
area. 
Some would argue that such a situation of excess profits could 
not be maintained over the long run. Competition should insure that more 
funds would come into the rental market until yields in the residential real 
estate market were exactly as good as investMents elsewhere. (Marcuse P., 
"Homeownership for Low Income Families: Financial Implication", Land Economics 
. May 1972; and Muth, R.F., "Cities and Housing", University of Chicago Press 
1969, p. 19). 
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If the latter view is correct, and prospective investors do 
in fact forecast rising future incomes, then the payment profiles would look 
something like those shown in Figure 4. In other words, the capital ele~ent 
of rents in any year should be less than the mortgage payments on similar 
properties bought in that same year. The financi.al differences for home-
owners and tenants could be explained by different rates at which they discount 
future consumption relative to the present. 
Reasons why this may not happen are as follows. First, investors 
in income properties may not believe that prices will rise. Investment 
decisions may therefore be based on the assumption that current rents will 
prevail, in which case many landlords will experience unexpected positive 
returns over the long run. It is also possible that future predictions are 
based on experience of the recent past, rather than a long run view. This 
could lead to very perverse short-term behaviour in a cyclical situation 
such as exists in Canadian Housing Markets. 
It may also be possible, that while the price trend of properties 
in the aggregate is definitely up, there may be considerable variability 
among individual properties. In such a situation, with a large number of 
small investors, very high yields may be required to offset risk. With 
a smaller number of larr-e investors, average risks could be considerably 
reduced, thereby reducing the yield required. Hhile the required risk might 
be reduced in such a situation, the emerP-ence of locational monopolies could 
well be used to keep returns at a high rate. Some policy that recognizes 
these related problems could well bring down average rental prices. 
\~1ether the views illustrated by Figure 3 or Figure 4 are 
correct is essentially a matter for empirical verification. There is certainly 
some indirect evidence that the situation outlined in Figure 3 may be what now 
exists. An American study by Richard V. Ratcliff called "Current Practices 
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in Income Property Appraisal- A Critique, 1966-1967", showed that of 79 
appraisal reports by real estate analysts, in only 10 cases was the initial 
income raised or lowered to represent the stabilized level of an expected 
rising or falling income. Andin no case, did the appraiser forecast an in-
creasing or decreasing income in step or curve form. 
In spite of the record over the past 20 years, there is still a 
feeling in many quarters that future price increases are by no means inevitable. 
A report prepared for the Hellyer Task Force on Housing, by KPM Nov. 1968, 
began '~ith terms of reference stating that policies aimed at increasing 
housing supply could stabilize or even decrease prices. A prevalent view of 
this sort could certainly lead to the high returns of Figure 3. 
An empirical study comparin~ rents and prices for similar properties 
co~ld go a long way towards establishing whether the situation in Figure 3 or 
Figure 4 has been historically correct. For the future, policy must depend 
to some extent on what will happen. I believe there are very strong theoretical 
reasons for saying that prices will continue to rise under the current system 
in urban areas, whether there are increases in supply or not. The argument is 
based on in~reasing returns to a scarce factor, land. This argument will be 
developed further in a later paper. 
The above discussion describes the basic framework for a study 
of the issues described in II 1, and II 2. From this no doubt several 
avenues for policy initiatives will follow. Possible examples are; ways 
to reduce returns to "normal" levels in the rental markets; and ways to 
overcome constraints to home o'\omership for lo,., income groups. 
The relationship between the ownership and private rental markets 
also has relevance for the role of public, and non-profit housing. 
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Consider first an unsubsidized non-profit housing scheme. If 
the situation as depicted in Figure 3 holds, then initially there is no 
advantage over home ownership or renting. As time goes on, however, the 
tenant receives the advantages of home ow~ership, provided the rents are 
held constant. The advantage would appear to be through elimination of 
technical constraints to home ownerhips. In relation to the rental market, 
such a program would be able·initially to offer little improvement on what 
now exists. As time goes by, however, the rents would become within the 
means of progressively lower income groups. 
This raises an important issue regarding the regulation of non-
profit organizations. Should tenants be allowed to eventually buy their 
homes, .and if so, at current market price, original market price or out-
standing principle? The issue concerns the respective welfares of 1 the in-
dividual tenant, and the organization~as a representative of low income 
people generally. Permission to buy or remain as a permanent tenant could 
contribute to social stability for the tenant and the neighbourhood. If the 
tenant is allowed to pay off outstanding principle only, then he makes a 
capital gain, and the organization starts off again at square one. If he buys 
at market price, the tenant would immediately increase his own annual payments 
for the same accomodation, but the organization would be able to purchase 
another home and let it to another low income family at a rate well below 
the market. 
In the willow park co-op, the capital gains are left with the 
organization when a tenant moves on. In Limited Dividend Housing, tenants 
are required to vacate when money incomes rise, hence the scheme caters for 
. progressively lower income groups at the cost of stability and security of 
tenure. 
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Consider now an unsubsidized non-profit scheme when the situation 
depicted in Figure 4 holds. The same basic comments apply as for homeowners 
and tenants. Non profit housing would provide an opportunity for quasi 
ownership for those now restricted by non financial barriers, whose time 
preferences make a constant payment schedule preferable. The difficulty 
here, is that in the first years they would be paying over the odds going in 
the rental market. In order to be on a financial par with homeowners, they 
would have to remain tenants for a very long time or alternatively they 
would require the option to purchase based on payment of outstanding principle. 
The same two cases, but with preferential interest subsidies 
are depicted below. 
Figure 5 Figure 6 
0 0 
In Figure 5, the subsidized non-profit rents are financially 
better than either the horneownership or private rental payments. In the 
Figure 6 situation, the subsidy is sufficient to compete with the private 
rental market in the initial years. An ever increasing advanta8e is then 
realized through the years. 
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IV. Policies 
The above discussion leads us to the question posed in II 4. 
Hhat implications does the above have for the financing and a pricing of non-
profit housing? One method, which can initially bring non-profit rents 
within the means of a lower income group than is now possible, and at the 
same time establish a more stable relationship with the rest of the market 
is a system of rent indexing. The principle is illustrated belm-1 in Figure 7, 
for a non subsidized non-profit organization where external market conditions 
as described in Figure 3 hold. 
For discussion see I. Stahl 11 Some Aspects of a Mixed Hous:!.ng 
Harket" in 11The Economic Problems of Housinp, 11 A.A. Nevitt, ed. 
Figure 7 
-
---
0 
The present value of the rents paid by the non-profit tenant 
and the mortgage costs of the owner.occupier are :identical. Only the time 
stream is changed. The system requires first a forecast of rent increases 
in the general market, and secondly a method of financing deficits in the 
early years as shm·m by the shaded area. There is nothing peculiar about such 
'· :1 
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a process. This form of calculation is often the basis for investment 
analysis in commercial and industrial sectors. Indeed, if the private rental 
market behaves in the rational competitive manner described earlier in Figure 
4, then this is exactly what they are dc~ng now. In this event, rent indexing 
in the non-profit sector would serve primarily to bring non-profit prices 
into a less disadvantageous position vis~a-vis the private market. 
The absence of nominal competitive profits, and the introduction 
of subsidized interest rates would of course give non-profit housing an overall 
advantage even in this case. This situation is shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 
Up to now, the discussion has been primarily concerned with 
comparisons between dwellings purchased in year zero, and then offered for 
sale or rent. What should be the pricing strategy for a non-profit or public 
housing corporation with a heterogeneous stock purchased over a period of 
years? 
Different possibilities without rent indexing are illustrated in 
Figure 9. The upward sloping line R represents the trend in market prices 
for units of a given ouality. The horizontal lines ~!0, Ml, M2, etc, are the 
annual fixed money mortgage payments for homes bought in years 0, 1, 2, etc. 
Prices can be set either according to the historical costs of the dwelling in 
question or the total costs could be pooled and averaged over the entire 
11 
stock for rent purposes. Alternatively, rents could be determined on the 
basis of tenants incomes in such a manner as to cover aggregate costs 
without reference to the historical costs of individual dwellings. With 
pooled averaged rents, the trendline would follow a curv~ like }~. 
_.,.;;:::;.._----1-- MJ f111t 
-
Figure 9 
With a system of rent indexing, the pooling feature would be 
taken care of almost automatically as shown in Figure 10. For instance, 
a house bought in year 0, with nomial mortgage payments of MO, could have 
an indexed rent schedule like RO. A home bought in year 1, with nom:i.nal 
mortgage payments of Ml could have an indexed rent schedule of Rl. As 
these are the same line, further pooling would be unnecessary. Note that 
this schedule is lmver than NA in the early years, and rises above MA in later 
years. 
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Figure 10 
---' 
0 
,. 
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-Some of the hypothesis described above, that apply to the historical 
experience of existing Limited Dividend, non-profit, public, and co-op 
housing should be possible to demonstrate by empirical study of costs and 
rents over time compared to the private market. 
An interesting opportunity to illustrate some of the issues 
may soon be available at the i·rj_llow Park Co-op. This co-op has been operat:i.ng 
for some time now in homes built 8 or 10 years ago. They now intend to add 
some further housing units. Comparison of cost covering rents on existing 
units with the new units will be possible. It will also be interesting to 
see how rents for the whole system are in fact determined. Without pooling, 
considerable rent differentials with consequent excess demands in the existing 
units may exist. A straight pooling system initiated now, might be unpopular 
with existing tenants. On the other hand it might be possible to institute 
a gradualist pooling system, by .raising rents on the existing units when 
they become vacant, and using this additional revenue to lower rents on the 
new units. 
Finally, a word about forecasting market price for purposes of 
establishing a rent index. Earlier, it was suggested that private enterprise 
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may require a substantial premium for risk due to wide variations in price 
changes for individual dwellings in the context of consistant and predictable 
average increases. The same could apply also to a small non-profit organization 
particularly with all of its units confined to a limited·segment of the market 
geographically or otherwise. The usual principles of size and diversification 
might be a requisite for such a system. Government is probably well placed 
to do this in the context of a public housing system. It might not be so easy 
for government to act as some form of guarantor for non-profit organizations. 
It is not hard to understand Rroups being willing to accept compensation 
for short falls in expected value increases for their own properties. It is 
harder, however, to envision organizations making above average gains, 
surrendering them to the common pool. 
To some extent, the guaranteed C}lliC mortgage insurance program 
does a similar thing for homeowners. Thinking futuristically, perhaps 
guaranteed index loans could be extended to cover the whole housing market, 
including non-profit, owner occupier, and private rental accomodation. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper has suggested a number of issues and ideas for 
~iscussion. Specific research projects have only been hinted at. There 
does, however, appear to be adequate scope here for developing a number 
of avenues for empirical research, and perhaps some selected field experi-
ments with the innovative ideas suggested. The time dimension of most of the 
issues will of course limit immediate monitoring of action research to an 
analysis of the implementation process. Evaluation of the programs' success 
or failure would have to await the passing of time. 
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The single most important question posed above concerns 
the issue of house price inflation at rates higher than prices generally. 
This essential, and I submit inevitable feature of private urban housing 
markets has received far too little attention in housinP, analysis of the 
past. 
Non profit rents, now tied to fixed annual money mortgage 
payments, offer little initial advantage over the private market, but 
become increasingly competitive as time goes on, and rents rise elsewhere. 
There appears to be considerable scope here for a new form of loan based 
on a rising schedule of payments. Initial payments could begin below the 
existing fixed annual rate, and rise with the market, paying back the 
differences in later years. This would immediately bring the program with-
in the financial means of lower income groups than heretofore. The same 
relative advantage would remain ~hrough time although it would not increase 
as under the fixed payment method. The lm11er initial prices would, hmvever, 
increase demand notv leaving a larger stock of housing priced at reasonable 
rents for the future. Hhile such a scheme may appear radical in contrast 
to existing Canadian practices, variations on the idea are now in operation 
in Germany, Denmark, and Holland. 
Terry Partridge 
October 13, 1972. 
